More on the Judicial Laws of the Old Testament

Almost two years ago, I posted The Judicial Laws of the Old Testament. If you are interested in the topic, I would recommend you begin there. What follows is a supplement to that post, with quotes from other writers on the topic to further support what I wrote there. 

William Perkins 

William Perkins (1558-1602) was a leading English theologian during the Elizabethan era. He was especially influential among the Puritans, including those who attended the Westminster Assembly. He wrote the following about the judicial laws of the Old Testament in A discourse of conscience (1596), p. 17-18 (spelling modernized). Notice how he is speaking of the relevance of these laws to nations and commonwealths, and how he makes the same twofold distinction I mention in my earlier post, and how he teaches that judicial laws of common (general) equity are, in respect of their substance, binding. 

But touching other nations and specially Christian commonwealths in these days, the case is otherwise. Some are of the opinion, that the whole judicial law is wholly abolished: and some again run to the other extreme, holding that the judicial laws bind Christians as straightly as the Jews: but no doubt they are both are wide; and the safest course is the keep to the mean between both. Therefore the judicial laws of Moses according to the substance and scope thereof must distinguished in which respects they are of two sorts. Some of them are laws of particular equity, some of common equity. Laws of particular equity, are such as prescribe justice according to the particular estate and condition of the Jews’ commonwealth and to the circumstances thereof time, place, persons, things, actions. Of this kind was the law, that the brother should raise up seed to his brother and many such like and none of them bind us because they were framed and tempered to a particular people.

Judicials of common equity are such as are made according to the law or instinct of nature common to all men: and these, in respect of their substance, bind the consciences not only of the Jews but also of the Gentiles: for they were not given to the Jews as they were Jews, that is, a people received into the covenant above all other nations, brought from Egypt to the land of Canaan, of whom the Messiah according to the flesh was to come: but they were given to them as they were mortal men subject to the order and laws of nature as all other nations are. Again, judicial laws, so far forth as they have in them the general or common equity of the law of nature are moral: and therefore binding in conscience, as the moral law.

Perkins goes on to describe that "a judicial law may be known to be a law of common equity" if either of two things be found in it: first, if wise men among the nations have by natural reason judged the same to be just and necessary, enacting laws the same in substance in their commonwealths; or second, "if it serve directly to explain and confirm any of the ten precepts of the Decalogue: or, if it serve directly to maintain and uphold any of the three estates of the family, the commonwealth, the Church. And whether this be so or no, it will appear, if we do but consider the matter of the law, and the reasons or considerations upon which the Lord was moved to give the same unto the Jews." He illustrates this by two such laws of common equity, that murderers be put to death and that the adulterer and adulteress should die the death.

Synopsis of Purer Theology

The Synopsis of Purer Theology, also known as “the Leiden Synopsis,” was an important and influential theological textbook from four professors of the University of Leiden first published in 1625. The following quotation is from the English translation published by Davenant Press in 2023 (the brackets in the quote are in that edition). Disputation 18, section 51 states,

Even to the present-day governing officials and their subjects one and all are obliged to obey those precepts in this political law that belong to the universal law; however, the ones that belong to the particular Jewish [political] law have become obsolete along with the Mosaic system of government.

Note again the distinction between general/universal and particular, with the precepts of the judicial/political law that belong to the universal law binding present-day governing officials and their subjects.

James Ussher

James Ussher (1581-1656) was the Archbishop of Armagh in Ireland and was invited to serve as a member of the Westminster Assembly. While he declined due to his royalist principles, he nevertheless had an influence on the assembly. One source of this influence was his book, The Body of Divinity (1645). Here is what that book has to say about the judicial laws (p. 204).

Did God give no other law but the Morall law onely?

Yes, he added the Ceremoniall and Judiciall laws, as speciall explications and applications of the law Morall, unto that present Church and people the Israelites.

What was the Ceremoniall law?

That law which did set down orders for direction in rites of outward worship, shadowing the grace of the Gospel (Heb. 10. 1, &c.)

Are we bound to keep and observe those laws?

No, for the substance being now exhibited, those shadows are utterly abolished by the death of Christ, and therefore the use of them now, would be a kind of denyall of his death.

What call you the Judiciall law?

That wherein God appointed a form of Politique and Civill government of the Common-wealth of the Jews, which therefore is ceased with the dissolution of that State, for which it was ordained; saving only in the common equity.

Is this law utterly revoked and abolished by Christ?

No; for he came not to overturn any good government of the Common-wealth, much lesse that which was appointed by God himself.

May not Christian Magistrates then swerve any thing from those laws of government, which were set down by Moses?

In some circumstances they may, but in the generall equity and substance they may not.

What Judiciall laws are immutably to be observed now of Christian Magistrates?

Those which have reasons annexed unto them, & specially those wherin God hath appointed death for the punishment of heinous offences.

What is the Morall law?

That which commandeth the perfection of godlinesse & righteousnesse, and directeth us in our duties to God and man, Deut. 5. 32. 12. 32.

The parallels to the language of the Westminster Confession (WCF 19.4) are noteworthy. Note also how he says that the judicial law is not utterly revoked and abolished by Christ, and that while Christian magistrates may swerve from those laws in some circumstances, they may not swerve from them in the general equity and substance. "Circumstances" are contrasted with "substance," as he also contrasts circumstance with substance with regard to worship (p. 225) - he is not using "in some circumstances" as we might to say "on some occasions." And he says that certain judicial laws are immutably to be observed now by Christian magistrates. As can be gathered from the context, "Christian magistrates" are mentioned in distinction from the Jewish magistrates of the Old Testament, not in contrast to unbelieving magistrates. The point is about the abiding authority of these laws on nations in this era ("now").

Ashbel Green 

Quotes from the time of the Westminster Assembly are most relevant for understanding its meaning, but it is useful also to note that the same way of speaking was maintained by later American Presbyterians as well. Ashbel Green (1762-1848) studied under John Witherspoon and was a Presbyterian pastor in Philadelphia, a member of the synod in 1788 that amended the Westminster standards and organized the General Assembly of the PCUSA, a chaplain of the US House of Representatives, and president of Princeton College. In his Lectures on the Shorter Catechism, vol. 2 (1841), p. 19, he makes the same distinction with regard to the judicial law (notice especially the last sentence; it is not just the law of nature, but any statute founded in the law of nature, that is still of binding force).

The judicial law of the ancient Israelites was that system of statutes which was given by God, for the temporal government of the Jews. It chiefly respected them as they were a nation distinct from all others — a theocracy, in which Jehovah sustained to them, not only the relation of Creator and Sovereign Lord, but that of a national head, or political chief. Some of these judicial laws, however, did not relate to the Jews as a peculiar people, but had their foundation clearly in the law of nature itself. This is, by no means, of small importance to be observed: because, although the judicial law, given by Moses, is completely abrogated, so far as it respected the peculiar constitution of the Jewish nation, yet, so far as it contains any statute founded in the law of nature, common to all nations, it is still of binding force.

Charles Hodge

Charles Hodge (1797–1878) grew up as a member of Ashbel Green's congregation and then attended Princeton College while Green was its president. Hodge went on to become a leading American Presbyterian theologian, serving as a professor at Princeton Theological Seminary from 1822 to his death in 1878. In his Systematic Theology, vol. 3 (p. 267-269), he mentions several classes of law in the Bible: (1) laws founded on the nature of God, (2) laws founded on the permanent relations of men in their present state of existence, and (3) laws founded in certain temporary relations of men. At this point, while discussing the third category, he comments on the judicial law. 

All those laws, therefore, in the Old Testament, which had their foundation in the peculiar circumstances of the Hebrews, ceased to be binding when the old dispensation passed away.

It is often difficult to determine to which of the last two classes certain laws of the Old Testament belong; and therefore, to decide whether they are still obligatory or not. Deplorable evils have flowed from mistakes as to this point. … On the other hand, there are some of the judicial laws of the Old Testament which were really founded on the permanent relations of men, and therefore, were intended to be of perpetual obligation, which many have repudiated as peculiar to the old dispensation. Such are some of the laws relating to marriage, and to the infliction of capital punishment for the crime of murder. If it be asked, How are we to determine whether any judicial law of the Old Testament is still in force? the answer is first, When the continued authority of such law is recognized in the New Testament. That for Christians is decisive. And secondly, If the reason or ground for a given law is permanent, the law itself is permanent.

After this he also goes on to mention a fourth class of laws: positive laws, driving all their authority from the explicit command of God.

Robert Shaw

Across the sea in Scotland, we find Robert Shaw (1795-1863), a Presbyterian pastor in Whitburn, writing the following about the judicial laws in his comments on WCF 19.4 in his commentary on the Westminster Confession of Faith (1845).

The judicial law respected the Jews in their political capacity, or as a nation, and consisted of those institutions which God prescribed to them for their civil government. This law, as far as the Jewish polity was peculiar, has also been entirely abolished; but as far as it contains any statute founded in the law of nature common to all nations, it is still obligatory. 

Conclusion

While applications of this interpretive principle could vary, yet the principle was rather stable. It was a common principle by the 1640s and then was enshrined in the Westminster Confession of Faith (19.4). Nevertheless, the general equity clause of WCF 19.4 is often overlooked today. All too often, people are quick to distance themselves from any abiding authority of the judicial laws in nations today.

While the judicial laws were given to a particular people in a particular situation (with both cultural and redemptive-historical particularities), the judicial laws of the Old Testament remain relevant for the governance of modern commonwealths. We neither dismiss them nor copy-and-paste them, but we distinguish. While the judicial laws expired with the state of ancient Israel, and do not bind states today insofar as they were peculiarly fitted to that state, yet they are binding on states today in substance insofar as they are of general equity.